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Abstract
In this paper we argue that the Sasaki adjunction, which formally encodes the logicality that different
authors tried to attach to the Sasaki hook as a ‘quantum implicative connective’, has a fundamental
dynamic nature and encodes the so-called ‘causal duality’ (Coecke, Moore and Stubbe 2001) for the
particular case of a quantum measurement with a projector as corresponding self-adjoint operator.
In particular: The action of the Sasaki hook (a
S
→ −) for fixed antecedent a assigns to some property
“the weakest cause before the measurement of actuality of that property after the measurement”, i.e.
(a
S
→ b) is the weakest property that guarantees actuality of b after performing the measurement repre-
sented by the projector that has the ‘subspace a’ as eigenstates for eigenvalue 1 , say, the measurement
that ‘tests’ a . From this we conclude that the logicality attributable to quantum systems contains
a fundamentally dynamic ingredient: Causal duality actually provides a new dynamic interpretation
of orthomodularity. We also reconsider the status of the Sasaki hook within ‘dynamic (operational)
quantum logic’ (DOQL), what leads us to the claim made in the title of this paper. More explicitly,
although (as many argued in the past) the Sasaki hook should not be seen as an implicative hook,
the formal motivation that persuaded others to do so, i.e. the Sasaki adjunction, does have a physical
significance (in terms of causal duality). It is within the context of DOQL that we can then derive
that the labeled dynamic hooks (forwardly and backwardly) that encode quantum measurements act
on properties as (a1
ϕa
→ a2) := (a1 →L (a
S
→ a2)) and (a1
ϕa
← a2) := ((a
S
→ a2)→L a1) , taking values in
the ‘disjunctive extension’ DI(L) of the property lattice L (Coecke 2001a) , where a ∈ L is the tested
property and (− →L −) is the Heyting implication that lives on DI(L) . Since these hooks (−
ϕa
→ −)
and (−
ϕa
← −) extend to DI(L)× DI(L) they constitute internal operations . In an even more radical
perspective one could say that the transition from either classical or constructive/intuitionistic logic
to quantum logic entails besides the introduction of an additional unary connective ‘operational res-
olution’ (Coecke 2001a) the shift from a binary connective implication to a ternary connective where
two of the arguments refer to qualities of the system and the third, the new one, to an obtained
outcome (in a measurement).
1. QUANTUM LOGICALITY
We claim that logical considerations on quantum behavior and as such, further development of the research
field, have been ‘corrupted’ by two features. Once these two features are neutralized, the way towards an
essentially dynamic quantum logic (i.e. a unified logic of ‘changes’ both for classical and quantum systems),
or otherwise put, a true quantum process semantics, is opened. Moreover, the solution to the second
‘corrupt feature’ indicates that the logicality encoded in pure quantum theory is of a fundamental dynamic
nature. Structures somewhat similar to those emerging in the context of categorical grammar (Lambek
1958), linear logic (Girard 1987, 2000), action logic (Baltag 1999) and computation and concurrency
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(Abramsky 1993; Milner 1999) then naturally emerge via a Kripke style approach for logical semantics
applied to the operational foundations of physics. The two features that obstructed true logicality are —
concerning the second, most non-quantum logicians have always agreed on its weakness:
i. The Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) ‘dilemma’: “Whereas logicians have usually assumed that [the
orthocomplementation] properties L71-L73 of negation were the ones least able to withstand a critical
analysis, the study of mechanics points to the distributive identities L6 as the weakest link in the algebra
of logic.” This dilemma forced the search and attempted identification of quantum logicality to proceed
‘orthogonal’ to intuitionistic and derived developments in logic.
ii. ‘Implication’ via the Sasaki adjunction: The fact that the pointwise action ϕ∗a(−) of Hilbert space
projectors on the subspace lattice, the quantum analogue of the action of classical lattice projections
(a ∧ −) , has the parameterized action (a
S
→ −) of the so-called Sasaki hook (−
S
→ −) as a right adjoint.
This Sasaki hook (as a binary operation) satisfies the minimal implicative condition (a
S
→ b) = 1⇐⇒ a ≤ b
(Kalmbach 1983) where ≤ naturally encodes physical consequence (Coecke, Moore and Smets 2001a).1
However, any proof theoretic consideration (among other things) did turn out to be impossible for a
logical system with (−
S
→ −) as implication since there cannot be a deduction theorem for it (Blok, Ko¨ler
and Pigozzi 1984; Malinowski 1990) .2 We explain all this in more detail in section 3.
It turns out that an operational analysis of quantum logicality starting from well-defined primitive
notions rather than from formal pragmatism eliminates these two features. Instead:
i. As shown in Coecke (2001a), the injective hull construction for meet-semilattices (Bruns and Lakser
1970; Horn and Kimura 1971) realizes a disjunctive extension of property lattices, the latter being the
physical incarnation of meet-complete and conjunctive quantum logicality (and nothing more!),3 in terms
of a complete Heyting algebra that goes equipped with an additional operation, ‘operational resolution’,
which recaptures the initial property lattice as its range, and this goes without any loss of the (physically
derivable) logical content of the initial lattice of properties. In the case of an atomistic property lattice the
inclusion of the property lattice in its distributive hull actually encodes the ‘state space - property lattice
duality’ (Coecke 2001b).4 This construction will be recalled in the fourth section of this paper.
ii. Propagation of physical properties is left adjoint to backward causal assignment (Coecke, Moore and
Stubbe 2001) — we provide a more intuitive presentation of this result in the section 5. Also in section
5 , we show that the Sasaki adjunction exactly encodes this adjunction for the case of propagation and
backward causal assignment of a quantum measurement. The minimal implicative condition expresses in
this perspective merely that the image under projection of the trivial property 1 is exactly the property on
which we project, i.e. ϕ∗a(1) = a. More important however, recalling that adjointness of Sasaki hook and
Sasaki projection for an ortholattice is equivalent to the ortholattice being orthomodular, causal duality
provides actually a new interpretation of orthomodularity.
Moreover, as shown in Coecke (2001b) and Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001b), when combining the
following features that result from the above:
1Recall that the adjointness of projection (a ∧ −) and implication (a → −) in classical and intuitionistic logic exactly
encodes the validity of modus ponens and deduction, in other words, the adjunction (sometimes called the ‘implicative
condition’) a ∧ x ≤ b ⇐⇒ x ≤ (a → b) is equivalent to a ∧ x ≤ b =⇒ x ≤ (a → b) together with a ∧ (a → b) ≤ b . By
means of applying the latter, i.e. modus ponens, given that x ≤ (a→ b) we indeed obtain a∧x ≤ a∧ (a→ b) ≤ b . We come
back to this further in this paper.
2In Hardegree (1975, 1979) and Herman, Marsden and Piziak (1975) it is pointed out that the Sasaki hook also fails to
satisfy strong transitivity, weakening and contraposition.
3For a demonstration of complete conjunctivity see Piron (1976) and Moore (1999). For the ‘and nothing more!’ see
Emch and Jauch (1965), Coecke (2001a) and Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001a).
4For a discussion of the categorical ‘state space - property lattice duality’ for atomistic orthocomplemented lattices,
physically and mathematically, see Moore (1995).
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i. property lattices admit a canonical disjunctive extension giving rise to an irredundant collection of
meaningful propositions on properties with a physically significant ordering,5
ii. a unary connective ‘operational resolution’ faithfully recaptures the physical properties within the
collection of propositions on these properties as its range, and,
iii. causal duality applies both to properties and to propositions on properties, respectively restricting
physically admissible evolution, and encoding preservation of propositional disjunction.
then, a Kripke-style approach for logical semantics applied to the operational foundations of physics yields
a logical structure with for each possible physical ‘environment’ (e.g., a measurement apparatus, a free or
imposed evolution, interaction in the presence of another system, etc.) the following connectives:
i. two implications (−
e
→ −) and (−
e
← −) that extend the physical content of propagation of (physical)
properties and backward causal assignment, and,
ii. two corresponding adjoint tensors (−⊗e −) and (−e⊗−) of which one is commutative and one isn’t.
This, since the Sasaki adjunction encodes causal duality, then establishes our claim made in the title
concerning the induced dynamic implications by the Sasaki hook. In the ‘static limit’, i.e. ‘freezed
dynamics’ with respect to some preferred referential frame for space-like properties, this structure yields
an intuitionistic logic equipped with the above mentioned operational resolution as an additional operation,
and both the hooks (−
e
→ −) and (−
e
← −) collapse into the [static] Heyting implication, and the tensors
(−⊗e −) and (−e⊗−) become binary conjunction.
6 We also recall here the following spin-off from all the
above (for details we refer to corresponding cited papers):
i. A proof of linearity for deterministic evolution and for the Hilbert space tensor product as a description
of quantum compoundness (Faure, Moore and Piron 1995; Coecke 2000).
ii. A generalized notion of linearity for indeterministic transitions that saturates into ordinary linearity in
the deterministic case (Coecke and Stubbe 1999; Coecke, Stubbe and Valckenborgh 2001).
iii. A counter example to van Benthem’s (1991, 1994) ‘general dynamic logic in terms of relational
structures’: relational inverses have not necessarily any physical significance for non-classical systems
(Coecke, Moore and Smets 2001b).
We will proceed as follows in this paper: Since we feel very strong about the fact that quantum logicality
cannot be treated as a purely mathematical matter without specifying what one is actually talking about
and that in every other case it might even be better to abandon the word quantum (at least as a reference
to physics) in ones discourse, we provide in the next section an outline of the primitive physical notions
from which we derive our formal notions.7 Next, we recall some mathematical preliminaries required
for this paper including Galois adjoints, Heyting algebras and the Sasaki adjunction itself. In section 4 ,
besides briefly recalling the results in Coecke (2001a), we discuss the Sasaki hook in perspective of these, in
particular we argue that any true implicative connective on the lattice of properties of a quantum system
has to be external and as such cannot be the Sasaki hook. In the fifth section, besides explaining causal
5For a clear distinction between the significance of ‘properties’ and ‘propositions on properties’ we initially refer to Coecke
(2001a) and the rest of this paper. Briefly, from a philosophical perspective one could say that properties are ontological
there where propositions on properties are to be situated at an epistemological meta-level.
6The multiplicative fragments respectively provide a commutative quantale and dual non-commutative quantale semantics
(Coecke 2001b; Coecke, Moore and Smets 2001b; Smets 2001) .
7Obviously there is something to say for the use of the word quantum referring to a domain of mathematics that studies
structures inspired on particular formal features of the quantum mechanical formalism such as non-distributivity, but this
still remains pure mathematics in absence of an outline of the primitive physical notions from which one derives formal
notions such as order, bounds and in particular of the significance of elements in any considered set on which one defines
these relations and connectives. In this context, for a recent survey of general operational quantum logic we refer to Coecke,
Moore and Wilce (2000).
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duality and as such the true significance of the Sasaki adjunction, we introduce ‘dynamic causal relations’
which express the intuitive contents of the Sasaki adjunction in an alternative way. These relations form
the core of our approach in the sixth section where the formal content of the Sasaki adjunction will be
implemented in the framework of DOQL — see also Coecke (2001b) , Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001b)
and Smets (2001) . Our analysis in this paper ends with an overview of the dynamic implications (−
ϕa
→ −)
and (−
ϕa
← −) which we can deduce from the Sasaki adjunction. Finally, section 7 points to the possible
impact of our approach on the field of quantum logic and opens new perspectives to be elaborated on in
the future.
2. WHAT QUANTUM LOGICALITY CAN BE ABOUT
We claim that it makes no sense to discuss quantum logicality without specifying what the elements in
the considered lattice physically stand for. Indeed, nonsense arguments, as for example indicated at in
Foulis and Randall (1984) and Piziak (1986), emerge due to conceptual mixup.8 See also Smets (2001 §6)
for a more general survey on misunderstandings and misconceptions on physical logicality. To situate our
perspective clearly we will recall here two major (well-defined) perspectives which are, although essentially
different respectively being ontological (Jauch and Piron 1969; Piron 1976) and empirical (Foulis and
Randall 1972; Randall and Foulis 1973), not at all exclusive (Foulis, Piron and Randall 1983), but which
give rise to different mathematical structures — see for example Coecke, Moore and Wilce (2000) for
an overview and Moore (1999) and Wilce (2000) for recent surveys respectively on the Jauch-Piron and
the Foulis-Randall perspective. How can one theoretically approach the behavior of a physical system?
As philosophers know very well (to whom physicist however in general don’t pay much attention) 9 there
are different answers to this question. As such, any approach requires a subtle specification of what the
primitive notions are one starts from. In Foulis and Randall (1972) and Randall and Foulis (1973) one
considers a notion to which we prefer to refer to as “observed events that reflect something about the
system’s qualities”, where in Jauch and Piron (1969) and Piron (1976) one considers “qualities of the
system that cause certain events to occur”, depending on the particular environment (e.g., presence of a
measurement device). As we know from quantum mechanics, the state of the system in general doesn’t
determine the outcome of a measurement, and, an event provoked by a measurement actually changes the
system’s qualities. As such, it comes as no surprise that these perspectives yield different mathematical
structures. To a certain extend one could say that both in the Jauch-Piron and Foulis-Randall perspective
we are interested in how the system interacts with its environment, although in the first case from the
‘system’s perspective’ where in the second case we rather consider the ‘environments perspective’, including
the physicist that effectuates the experiments, or in other words, an endo- versus an exo-perspective —
see also Coecke (2001b) for a discussion on this matter, slightly deviating from the original Jauch-Piron
approach allowing some additional flexibility in view of actual applications. Obviously, since the Foulis-
Randall perspective is an exo-perspective, the measurements are made explicit within the formalism. Their
formalism is indeed essentially about how the system’s behavior is reflected through measurements, without
specifying the behavior itself. In the Jauch-Piron perspective where we focus on the system’s behavior
itself this is a somewhat more subtle matter. Since it adopts an endo-perspective, the measurement is
not a priori part of the ‘universe of discourse’. Therefore it will be incorporated in a conditional way,
8We rather not refer to the papers containing mathematical/conceptual flaws but give credit to those who tackled them.
9See for example Rovelli (1999) who backs us up on this: “I am convinced of the reciprocal usefulness of a dialog between
physics and philosophy (Rovelli 1997). This dialog has played a major role during the other periods in which science faced
foundational problems. In my opinion, most physicists underestimate the effect of their own epistemological prejudices on
their research [...] On the one hand, a more acute philosophical awareness would greatly help the physicists engaged in
fundamental research: Newton, Heisenberg and Einstein couldn’t have done what they have done if they weren’t nurtured
by (good or bad) philosophy.”
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explicitly as “a system in a particular realization p, i.e. state, possesses a quality a if it is the case that:
whenever it (in realization p) is within environment ea then it causes phenomenon αa to happen” and it
is by this statement that we identify a particular quality of the system10 — this explicit consideration of
the environment (or context), even in the system’s endo-perspective, is what gives the operational flavour
to this approach.11
Before we continue let us first recall some basic order theoretical notions. A complete lattice is a
bounded partially ordered set (L,≤, 0, 1) which is such that every subset A ⊆ L has a greatest lower
bound or meet
∧
A. It then follows that every subset A ⊆ L also has a smallest upper bound or join
∨
A
via Birkhoff’s theorem: ∨
A =
∧
{b ∈ L| ∀a ∈ A : b ≥ a} . (1)
If the bounded poset (L,≤, 0, 1) only admits finite greatest lower bounds and finite least upper bounds
we call it a lattice. In case it has only finite greatest lower bounds and not necessarily least upper
bounds we call it a meet-semilattice. A first main example of a complete lattice is the lattice LH of
closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H, ordered by inclusion, or, isomorphically, the lattice of orthogonal
projectors on this Hilbert space, ordered via PA ≤ PB ⇔ PB ◦ PA = PA ◦ PB = PA , i.e. if and only
if we have A ⊆ B for the corresponding subspaces (Dunford and Schwartz 1957 §VI.3). In the closed
subspace perspective meets correspond to intersection and joins to closed linear span. In the projector
perspective it is harder to grasp the operations meets and join since they only can be expressed in a simple
tangible way in case of commuting projectors (Dunford and Schwartz 1957 §VI.3). A second example is
the powerset P(X) of any set X , i.e. the set of subsets of this set, ordered again by inclusion and meets
and joins are respectively intersection and union. Orthomodular lattices generalize these two cases of
the Hilbert space projection lattice and the powerset of a set. Recall here that an orthomodular lattice
is a lattice that goes equipped with an orthocomplementation ′ : L → L, defined by a ≤ b ⇒ b′ ≤ a′,
a ∧ a′ = 0, a ∨ a′ = 1 and a′′ = a, and which is such that a ≤ b implies a ∨ (a′ ∧ b) = b . Alternative
characterizations of orthomodularity can be found in section 3 of this paper. One verifies that every
modular ortholattice is also an orthomodular lattice, and for that reason one refers to the additional
property an orthomodular lattice has compared to an ortholattice as weak modularity.12 For ortholattices
we have as such the following hierarchy Distributive =⇒ Modular =⇒ Weakly Modular , or, in terms of
objects, BoolAlg ⊂ MOL ⊂ OML . We refer to Bruns and Harding (2000) for a recent survey on algebraic
aspects of this matter. Finally recall that both examples considered above are examples of so-called
atomistic lattices respectively having the one-dimensional subspaces ΣH and the singletons {{x}|x ∈ X}
10Note here also that “whenever the system is within environment ea then it causes phenomenon αa to happen” corresponds
with Piron’s “whenever a definite experimental project is effectuated we obtain a positive outcome with certainty” (Piron
1976; Moore 1999) where the definite experimental project includes both a physical procedure, say placing the system within
environment ea, and specification of what is a positive answer to this procedure, say phenomenon αa happens. By referring
to a causal connection we aim to avoid the confusion raised by use of the notion ‘certainty’ in Piron’s formulation. One
could also more naively say that Piron’s formulation is an active one (from a physicist’s perspective) where our’s is a passive
one. Again, by the passive formulation we avoid any connotation with some role that is in many interpretations of quantum
theory ascribed to the so-called ‘observer’.
11Note that operationalism has here nothing to do with instrumentalism. In Piron’s formulation the tendency towards
an instrumentalist interpretation is however a bit stronger due to the explicit presence of ‘definite experimental projects’.
By considering general environments instead of specific physical procedures we hope to avoid some confusion and eliminate
the link to P.W. Bridgman’s operationalism since in our case, physical qualities have an extension in reality and are not by
means of definitions reducible to sets of procedures — see Smets (2001 §1).
12You have reason to be confused here. However, an orthomodular lattice is in general not modular. Clearly a case of bad
terminology, due to some formal confusion at the early development of the subject, something what most probably did not
contribute to its general appreciation.
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as atoms, explicitly,
∀A ∈ LH : A =
∨
H
{ray(ψ) ∈ ΣH| ray(ψ) ⊆ A} and ∀T ∈ P(X) : T =
⋃
{{x}|x ∈ T} , (2)
thus satisfying the general atomisticity condition ∀a ∈ L : a =
∨
{p ∈ Σ|p ≤ a} , where Σ denotes the
atoms of L , i.e. p ∈ Σ if and only if ∀a ∈ L : a ≤ p⇒ a ∈ {0, p} .
Now, coming back to the two perspectives on logicality mentioned above, we will “initially” take the
endo-perspective, and look at the true ‘proper’ qualities of the system, to which we will refer briefly as
properties. Later in the paper, the exo-perspective will enter natually when defining logical hooks. The
resulting structure will as such incorporate both! So in this paper a property is definitely not to be
envisioned merely as an observed quality/quantity, since that would be an event of the Foulis-Randall
perspective. We as such do assume a form of realism in the sense that properties do exist in absence of a
measurement.13 For example, in the dark, one could attribute the property referred to as ‘red’ to an object
which is such that, “whenever there is a white light source brought in its environment that shines on it,
it radiates red light”. Note here that we implicitly assume a system to be well-specified. Depending on
its possible realization p (say state), the system possesses different properties Lp , referred to as the actual
properties for that particular realization p. The collection of all properties that the system can possess
within the boundaries of its domain of specification, all the corresponding realizations themselves being
denoted as Σ (any other realization will be considered as destruction of the system), will be denoted by L.
This set L goes naturally equipped with a partial order in terms of “actuality of a ∈ L implies actuality
of b ∈ L”, i.e. for any (fixed) state we have that: if it is the case that “whenever it (...) is in environment
ea then it causes phenomenon αa to happen”, then this implies that “whenever it (...) is in environment
eb then it causes phenomenon αb to happen”. Denoting “a is actual in state p” as p ≺ a this formally
becomes
(a ≤ b) ⇐⇒ (∀p)(p ≺ a⇒ p ≺ b) . (3)
Moreover, this poset is closed under ‘conjunctions’
∧
A of properties A ⊆ L where actuality of
∧
A
stands for “any a ∈ A is actual”, what actually means that, for each a ∈ A, whenever the system (...)
is within environment ea then it causes phenomenon αa to happen.
14 So we consider here a not fully
specified environment in order to establish, slightly abusively, a disjunction of environments {ea}a∈A (and
corresponding phenomena {αa}a∈A).
15 The feature that distinguishes quantum systems from classical
systems is the fact that we cannot define a disjunction of a collection A in this way. Given A ⊆ L, the
statement “some a ∈ A is actual” would require a simultaneity, or again slightly abusively, a conjunction
of environments what conflicts with quantum theory where we have incompatibility of measurements
corresponding to non-commuting self-adjoint operators. The conjunction
∧
defined above provides L with
a complete lattice structure, where, as already mentioned, the corresponding joins have not necessarily a
disjunctive significance.16 In particular can there be properties b ∈ L that do not imply that some a ∈ A is
actual but that do imply the join
∨
A ∈ L to be actual, the so-called superposition principle of quantum
13Reality is obviously in no way to be understood as synonym for ‘locality and non-contextuality’ as it is sometimes the
case in some (from a philosophical perspective) slightly naive discourses on philosophy of physics.
14Note here that contrary to a Tarskian perspective where one abstracts over the true sense of meets, we give a particular
operational significance to it. Conjunctivity is in a sense “conjunctivity with respect to actuality”, i.e. with respect to
“causing phenomena αa for a ∈ A to happen whenever (...)”. See for example Girard, Lafont and Taylor (1989) for a survey
of some similar operational considerations on connectives in computation and proof theory, where one focuses in particular
on the ‘dynamics’ underlying proofs and programs.
15Or, in Piron’s terms “choose any a ∈ A and place the system in ea”, i.e. a choice of environment. Again, in order to
avoid any cognitive connotation, we prefer to avoid the word ‘choice’ (although, we don’t see any a priori problem in its use).
16‘Disjunctive’ to be seen again in terms of “disjunctive with respect to actuality”.
6
theory — see Aerts (1981) and Coecke (2001a) for a rigorous discussion on this matter. Let us stress that
at this point, as argued in Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001a), the full physically derivable logical content
that emerges from our operational setting consists of a consequence relation17 ⊢ ⊆ P(L)×L , that extends
the lattice ordering ≤ ⊆ L× L exploiting conjunctivity, i.e.
∀a ∈ A : “a is actual” ⇐⇒ “
∧
A is actual” , (4)
since this allows to transcribe the set {“a is actual”| a ∈ A} as “
∧
A is actual” it justifies setting 18
a, . . . (a ∈ A) ⊢ b ⇐⇒
∧
A ⊢ b ⇐⇒
∧
A ≤ b . (5)
We can introduce a (semantic) satisfaction relation |= ⊆ Σ × L , exactly being the actuality relation ≺
between states and properties — we prefer to have this double use of notation≺ and |= to stress whether we
are either talking about the physical content or the derived logicality. As such satisfaction and consequence
are for single assumptions related by
a ⊢ b ⇐⇒ (∀p)(p |= a⇒ p |= b) (6)
and thus in general we have that a, . . . (a ∈ A) ⊢ b ⇐⇒ (∀p)((∀a ∈ A : p |= a) ⇒ p |= b) . For
transparancy of the argument below we essentially consider single properties as arguments. The (hypo-
thetical!) existence of some implication connective (− → −) : L×L would at least require that it satisfies
the so-called ‘minimal implicative condition’, for single assumptions being a ⊢ b ⇐⇒ ⊢(a→ b) , such that
it extends the physically derivable implication relation encoded as the lattice ordering, what transcribes
in lattice and state terms respectively as
a ≤ b ⇐⇒ (a→ b) = 1 and ∀p ∈ Σ : (p ≺ a⇒ p ≺ b) ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ Σ : p ≺ (a→ b) . (7)
However, validity of deduction moreover transcribes as (sensu Gentzen’s sequent calculus) {a, c} ⊢ b ⇒
c ⊢(a→ b), or exploiting conjunctivity, a ∧ c ⊢ b⇒ c ⊢(a→ b) , what transcribes in lattice terms as
a ∧ c ≤ b =⇒ c ≤(a→ b) . (8)
Note here that the minimal implicative condition is actually a weakened form of the deduction theorem.
Validity of both modus ponens c ⊢(a→ b)⇒ {c, a} ⊢ b assures the converse implication, i.e.
a ∧ c ≤ b ⇐= c ≤(a→ b) . (9)
We will come back to this point in the next section after recalling adjointness.
3. SASAKI ADJUNCTION
17For the sake of the argument, we initially introduce here a Tarskian notion of consequence relation, i.e. following Tarski
(1936, 1956) . As such it can be seen as a binary relation on sets of formulas which satisfies reflexivity, monotonicity and
transitivity. Later on we will extend this notion of consequence relation to allow multiple conclusions — see eq.(23) —
following the ideas of D. Scott. Note however that in contemporary literature this type of consequence relation is often
replaced by a ‘weaker one’ in the sense that substructural logicians prefer to work with multisets and/or non-monotonic
logicians drop the monotonicity condition — for more details on this matter we refer to Avron (1994).
18One could say that the notation a, . . . (a ∈ A) for representing actuality of each member in A , i.e. ∀a ∈ A : “a is actual”
could be simplified by writing down A , since in general in sequent calculus a list of assumptions on the left of ⊢ always has to
be interpreted conjunctively, i.e. as identifiable with the meet. However, further we will consider collections A ⊆ L in terms
of ∃a ∈ A : “a is actual” and they will also appear on the left of ⊢ since we will consider them as primitive propositions. The
notion a, . . . (a ∈ A) is as such required to avoid confusion.
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We recall some basic features of Galois adjoints. A more detailed survey of Galois adjoints can be found
in Erne´ et al (1993) and for Galois adjoints in a more physical perspective we refer to Coecke and Moore
(2000). A pair of maps f ∗ : L→ M and f∗ : M → L between posets L and M is Galois adjoint, denoted
by f ∗ ⊣ f∗, if and only if
f ∗(a) ≤ b⇔ a ≤ f∗(b) . (10)
Stressing the mathematical importance of adjoints, we respectively quote the co-father of category theory
S. Mac Lane and logician R. Goldblatt (Goldblatt 1984 p.438):
“... adjoints occur almost everywhere in many branches of mathematics. ... a systematic use
of all these adjunctions illuminates and clarifies these subjects.”
“The isolation and explication of the notion of adjointness is perhaps the most profound con-
tribution that category theory has made to the history of general mathematical ideas.”
One could even say that where in the beginning days of category theory the claim was made that it are the
functors and natural transformations that constitute the core of category theory rather than the categories
themselves, that it are actually the adjunctions that provide the true power. Coming back to eq.(10), in
the case that f ∗ and f∗ are inverse, and thus L and M isomorphic, the above inequalities saturate in
equalities. As we show below, the notion of Galois adjoint retains some essential uniqueness properties
of inverses. Whenever f ∗ ⊣ f∗ then f
∗ preserves all existing joins and f∗ all existing meets. This means
that for a Galois adjoint pair between complete lattices, one of these maps preserves all meets and the
other preserves all joins. Conversely, for L and M complete lattices, any meet preserving map f∗ : M → L
has a unique join preserving left Galois adjoint and any join preserving map f ∗ : L → M a unique meet
preserving right Galois adjoint, respectively,
f ∗ : a 7→
∧
{b ∈M |a ≤ f∗(b)} f∗ : b 7→
∨
{a ∈ L|f ∗(a) ≤ b} . (11)
Thus, it follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the join preserving maps between
complete lattices and the meet preserving maps in the opposite direction, this so-called ‘duality’ being
established by Galois adjunction. One also verifies that eq.(10) is equivalent to
∀a ∈ L : a ≤ f∗(f
∗(a)) and ∀b ∈M : f ∗(f∗(b)) ≤ b . (12)
Considering pointwise ordering of maps, i.e. for f, g : L → M , f ≤ g ⇔ ∀a ∈ L : f(a) ≤ g(a) we can
write the above as idL ≤ f∗ ◦ f
∗ and f ∗ ◦ f∗ ≤ idM where idL and idM are the respective identities on L
and M . Now, coming back to eq.(8) and eq.(9) of the previous section one sees that they define, when
both of them are valid, an adjunction (a ∧ −) ⊣ (a→ −) for all a ∈ L . This particular property, i.e. the
existence of a hook that acts as a right adjoint to the parameterized action of the meet, actually defines
a Heyting algebra, a type of lattice to which we turn our attention now.
Let us recall some features of Heyting algebras — for a recent survey see for example Borceux (1994). A
Heyting algebra is a lattice (H,∧,∨) equipped with an additional binary operation (− → −) : H×H → H
that satisfies a∧b ≤ c⇔ a ≤ (b→ c) , i.e. after exchanging a and b and applying commutativity of (−∧−) ,
the action of the meet is indeed left adjoint to the action of the hook, explicitly we have (a∧−) ⊣ (a→ −)
for all a ∈ H . As such, a complete Heyting algebra encodes those lattices in which we encode validity of
modus ponens and deduction in a semantical way. Also following from this adjointness, in any Heyting
algebra (a ∧ −) preserves existing joins, explicitly, a ∧ (b ∨ b′) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ b′), so it turns out that
a Heyting algebra is always distributive . In fact, any Boolean algebra, e.g., P(X) for any set, turns out
to be a Heyting algebra with (a → b) = ca ∨ b , where c denotes complementation, (a → b) then being
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logically interpretable as “(not a) or b”. A so-called pseudo-complement can be defined on any Heyting
algebra as ¬(−) : H → H : a 7→ (a → 0) given a lower bound 0 of H . It then however turns out that
contrary to a Boolean algebra we in general don’t have that ¬a ∨ a = 1 given an upper bound 1 of H ,
what justifies the notion of pseudo-complement. In this paper we will only consider complete Heyting
algebras, where a Heyting algebra is complete if and only if the underlying lattice is complete. Now, since
(a ∧ −) preserves the joins of all subsets of a complete Heyting algebra H , we obtain a stronger form of
distributivity namely a ∧ (
∨
B) =
∨
b∈B(a ∧ b) . In fact, this complete distributivity now fully determines
the complete Heyting algebra structure in the sense that for all a ∈ H the map (a∧−) : H → H preserves
all joins so it has a unique right adjoint (a→ −) : H → H . So complete Heyting algebras are complete
lattices where the join of all subsets is completely distributive over binary meets. We will now present
an example of a complete Heyting algebra which is in general not a Boolean algebra. Let L be any poset
and set ↓ a := {b ∈ L|b ≤ a} for a ∈ L and introduce a downset or order ideal as any set of the form
↓ [A] := {b ∈ L|∃a ∈ A : b ≤ a} =
⋃
a∈A ↓a with ∅ 6= A ⊆ L , i.e. I is an order ideal if and only if I 6= ∅
and a ≤ b ∈ I implies a ∈ I . Order ideals of the form ↓ a for a ∈ L are called principal ideals. It then
turns out that the collection of non-empty downsets I(L) := {↓ [A]|∅ 6= A ⊆ L} constitutes a complete
Heyting algebra. Indeed, since unions and intersections of downsets are again downsets, I(L) is closed
under unions and intersections from which it follows that they respectively constitute the join and meet
in I(L) . Distributivity of I(L) is as such inherited from that of P(L) . Using eq.(11) we can now compute
the corresponding Heyting algebra hook
(B →I(L) C) =
⋃
{A ∈ I(L)|A ∩ B ⊆ C} = {a ∈ L|∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b ∈ C} . (13)
As pseudo-complement we obtain ¬B = (B →I(L) 0I(L)) = {a ∈ L|∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b = 0L} . So in general
we indeed do not have B
⋃
¬(B) = 1I(L) . The most simple example of a Heyting algebra which is not
Boolean is a three element chain {0 < a < 1} . In particular are the downsets of any chain isomorphic
to the chain itself, establishing the claim that downsets in general don’t constitute a Boolean algebra.
Another example are the open sets of a topological space ordered by inclusion.
Recall that for the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space the Sasaki projection
ϕ∗A : LH → LH : B 7→ A ∩ (A
⊥ ∨H B) (14)
exactly encodes the action of the orthogonal projector PA that projects on the subspace A , so in particular
we have for the action on rays that
ϕ∗A(ray(ψ)) = A ∩ (A
⊥ ∨H ray(ψ)) = ray(PA(ψ)) (15)
where we identify ray(PA(ψ)) in case that ψ ⊥ A with the zero dimensional subspace. Moreover, for an
arbitrary orthomodular lattice L , setting
ϕ∗a : L→ L : b 7→ a ∧ (a
′ ∨ b) and ϕa,∗ : L→ L : b 7→ a
′ ∨ (a ∧ b) , (16)
for all a ∈ L, we have ϕ∗a ⊣ ϕa,∗ . Indeed, if a∧ (a
′ ∨ b) ≤ c then a′∨ (a∧ (a ∧ (a′ ∨ b))) ≤ a′ ∨ (a∧ c) where
b ≤ a′ ∨ b = a′ ∨ (a ∧ (a′ ∨ b)) since a′ ≤ a′ ∨ b , and analogously one proves the converse. This adjunction
actually embodies why the Sasaki hook (−
S
→ · ) := ϕ(−),∗( · ) has been interpreted as an implication, since
ϕ∗a coincides with (a ∧ −) : L→ L , the classical projections, in the case that L is distributive since then
a∧ (a′ ∨ b) = (a ∧ a′) ∨ (a ∧ b) = 1 ∨ (a ∧ b) = a∧ b.19 In particular do we as such retain an adjunction of
19This view is obviously motivated by the fact that where for a Heyting algebra the actions {(a∧−)|a ∈ L} can be envisioned
as projections on a, for orthomodular lattices the Sasaki projections {ϕ∗a|a ∈ L} are the closed orthogonal projections in the
Baer ∗-semigroup of L-hemimorphisms (Foulis 1960) which, as mentioned above, coincide in the case of the subspace lattice
of a Hilbert space with the action of the closed projectors of the underlying Hilbert space. We also refer to Coecke and Smets
(2000) for complementary details on this matter.
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projection action and hook, mimicking the one that one has for complete Heyting algebras that embodies
the validity of modus ponens and the kind of deduction theorem obtained by combining eq.(8) and eq.(9) .
However, this in no way implies that all tools available in classical/intuitionistic logic will still be valid
within this setting. Let us briefly outline how the minimal implicative condition and the adjointness for the
Sasaki hook relate, both in the cases that we abstract over the explicit formulation of the Sasaki hook and
the Sasaki projection, i.e. the case of a general abstract adjoint implication (Hardegree 1979, 1981) on a
bounded poset, and the case of them being explicitly defined on an ortholattice. We follow Coecke, Moore
and Smets (2001c). Let J(L) be the collection of isotone maps on a bounded poset L that admit a right
adjoint. An adjoint implication is then defined by a map ϕ˜∗ : L→ J(L) : a 7→ ϕ˜∗a that satisfies ϕ˜
∗
a(1) = a.
The parameterized right adjoint (−
ϕ˜
→ −) : L × L → L , i.e. ϕ˜∗a ⊣ (a
ϕ˜
→ −) := ϕ˜a,∗ , is then to what
we refer as the adjoint implication. The condition ϕ˜∗a(1) = a implies the minimal implicative condition
via explicitation of the adjunction, i.e. ϕ˜∗a(1) ≤ c ⇔ b ≤ (a
ϕ˜
→ c), for b = 1. One could as such state
that because the Sasaki projections satisfy ϕ∗a(1) = a , the Sasaki hook satisfies the minimal implicative
condition. For an ortholattice it turns out that adjointness of the Sasaki hook and the Sasaki projection is
equivalent to one side of the implicative condition, namely (a
S
→ x) = 1⇒ a ≤ x — notice that the other
side is trivially satisfied for ortholattices since a ≤ x implies a′∨(a∧x) = a′∨a = 1. From this perspective
one can say that the minimal implicative condition incarnates the fact that the Sasaki hook arises as the
right adjoint of Sasaki projections. Moreover, these two alternative definitions are actually equivalent to
the ortholattice being orthomodular, and as such provide alternative characterizations of orthomodularity,
respectively one that can be written equationally, a rather logical one, and one in terms of an adjunction.
Proposition 1. The following are equivalent for an ortholattice L :
i. L is orthomodular, i.e. a ≤ b implies a ∨ (a′ ∧ b) = b ;
ii. For all a ∈ L we have (a
S
→ x) = 1⇒ (or ⇔) a ≤ x ;
iii. For all a ∈ L we have ϕ∗a(−) ⊣ (a
S
→ −) .
By (i.)⇔ (ii.) , one has a statement concerning logicality attributed to the Sasaki hook in terms of the min-
imal implicative condition, or equivalently, the Sasaki adjunction incarnates the utterance ‘orthomodular
logic’.20 As is reflected in the title and introduction of this paper, we do not follow this line of thought! For
us, it is (i.)⇔ (iii.) that will provide a new interpretation of orthomodularity in terms of causal duality.
4. TRUE IMPLICATIVE QUANTUM LOGICALITY
In this section we essentially follow Coecke (2001a). As discussed in section 2 the lattice of properties
in general does not encode arbitrary disjunction, since otherwise, they would constitute the joins and as
such all joins would be disjunctions, what is in general not the case. Let us first analyze what happens in
a (dichotomic) perfect quantum measurement.21 Consider a (dichotomic) perfect quantum measurement
of the property a ∈ L and correspondingly, its orthocomplement a′ . Assuming that a property b ∈ L is
actual before the measurement, it follows, since the Sasaki projections encode projectors on subspaces,
that after the measurement either ϕ∗a(b) or ϕ
∗
a′(b) is actual. Indeed, referring back to eq.(14) and eq.(15) ,
and recalling that dichotomic measurements are in quantum theory represented by self-adjoint operators
with a binary spectrum, the projectors on the corresponding (mutually orthogonal) eigenspaces are then
exactly encoded by ϕ∗A and ϕ
∗
A⊥
, where A and A⊥ are the corresponding eigenspaces. Writing “we
obtain either ϕ∗A(ray(ψ)) or ϕ
∗
A⊥
(ray(ψ)) as outcome state” then corresponds to an abstraction over the
20See also Moore (1993) on this matter.
21For the introduction of the respective concepts of (dichotomic) ideal measurement and (dichotomic) measurement of the
first kind, and, conjointly, a (dichotomic) perfect measurement, we refer to Pauli(1958) and Piron (1976).
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corresponding probabilistic weights of the two outcomes in a dichotomic measurement, focusing on the
fact that whenever we are not in an eigenstate, there is an uncertainty on the outcome. Consequently,
there is also an uncertainty on the corresponding ‘change of state’ (according to the projection postulate),
and as such, an uncertainty on the corresponding ‘change of actual properties’. We refer to this logical
feature of quantum measurements as the ‘emergence of disjunction in quantum measurements’. Writing
this in a more formal, although intuitive way using a consequence ‘symbol’ we obtain:
“b actual” ⊢perf. meas. of {a,a′} “ϕ
∗
a(b) actual” or “ϕ
∗
a′(b) actual” (17)
or, when assuming the existence of an appropriate implicative connective −→perf. meas. of {a,a′} that satisfies
the corresponding minimal implicative condition this becomes via the corresponding weakened form of the
deduction theorem:
“b actual” −→perf. meas. of {a,a′} “ϕ
∗
a(b) actual” or “ϕ
∗
a′(b) actual” . (18)
Unfortunately, “ϕ∗a(b) actual” or “ϕ
∗
a′(b) actual”, i.e. “a member of the pair {ϕ
∗
a(b), ϕ
∗
a′(b)} is actual”,
is not encoded in the lattice of properties of a quantum system as an element since for example, taking
b = 1, we have ϕ∗a(1) ∨ ϕ
∗
a′(1) = 1 independent on a although the possible states the system can have —
given that “ϕ∗a(b) actual” or “ϕ
∗
a′(b) actual” — definitely depend on a . Thus, it would make sense to have
logical propositions that express disjunctions of properties since they emerge in quantum processes, in the
endo-perspective. The question then arises whether we can extend L with propositions of the type “ϕ∗a(b)
actual” or “ϕ∗a′(b) actual”, or equivalently, “a member of {ϕ
∗
a(b), ϕ
∗
a′(b)} is actual”, without loosing the
logicality encoded in the initial lattice of properties, i.e. the lattice order, and whether this can be done
in a non-redundant, canonical or even mathematically universal way.22
A first candidate for encoding disjunctions would be the powerset P(L). However, if a ≤ b we don’t
have {a} ⊆ {b} so we do not preserve the initial logicality, or, otherwise stated, if a < b then the
propositions {a} and {a, b} (‘read’ {a, b} as: either a or b is actual) mean the same thing, since actuality
of b is implied by that of a . We can clearly overcome this problem by restricting to order ideals I(L) :=
{↓ [A]|A ⊆ L} ⊂ P(L) . However, we encounter a second problem. In case the property lattice would
be a complete Heyting algebra in which all joins encode disjunctions, then A and {
∨
A} again mean
the same thing. As argued in Coecke (2001a), this redundancy is then exactly eliminated by considering
distributive ideals DI(L) (Bruns and Lakser 1970), that is, order ideals, that are closed under joins of
distributive sets (abbreviated as distributive joins), i.e. if A ⊆ I ∈ DI(L) then
∨
A ∈ I whenever we have
∀b ∈ L : b∧
∨
A =
∨
{b∧a | a ∈ A}. For L atomistic and Σ ⊆ L , DI(L) ∼= P(Σ) which implies that DI(L)
is a complete atomistic Boolean algebra (Coecke 2001a) . We can moreover provide a from a mathematical
perspective more regourous reasoning which exhibits the canonical nature of this construction. Consider
the following definitions for A ⊆ L :
i.
∨
A is called disjunctive iff (“
∨
A is actual” ⇔ ∃a ∈ A : “a is actual”) ;23
ii. Superposition states for
∨
A are states for which “
∨
A is actual” while “no a ∈ A is actual” ;
iii. Superposition properties for
∨
A are properties of which the actuality implies that “
∨
A is actual”
(without being equivalent to
∨
A) , and, that can be actual while “no a ∈ A is actual”.
Extending the satisfaction relation encoding actuality by p |= A ⇐⇒ ∃a ∈ A : p |= a allows us to set
(∀p)(p |=
∨
A ⇔ p |= A) ⇐⇒
∨
A is disjunctive , (19)
22Note that the fact that the or that we obtain in a perfect measurement is exclusive does not have to be encoded explicitly
since it is already captured by the orthocomplementation since we have ϕ∗a(b) ∧ ϕ
∗
a′(b) = 0 by a ∧ a
′ = 0 such that “both ϕ∗b
and ϕ∗b′ are actual” is excluded — 0 indeed encodes the ‘absurd’.
23Compare this definition with the one of conjunctivity.
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(p |=
∨
A and p 6|= A) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Σ is a superposition state of
∨
A , (20)
(b ⊢˙
∨
A and b 6⊢ A) ⇐⇒ b ∈ L is a superposition property of
∨
A . (21)
where a ⊢˙ b means a ⊢ b but b 6⊢ a .
Proposition 2. If “existence of superposition states implies existence of superposition properties” then
∨
A disjunctive ⇐⇒
∨
A distributive . (22)
Proof: See Coecke (2001a) . •
The necessity condition “existence of superposition states implies existence of superposition properties” can
be illustrated by means of the following example. When considering the four element lattice {0 ≤ a, a′ ≤ 1}
even then distributivity and disjunctivity are not necessarily equivalent, for example in the case that
Σ = {p, q, r} and p ≺ a, q ≺ a′, r ≺ 1 and r 6≺ a, a′ — the superposition state r for a ∨ a′ has no
corresponding superposition property. Note here that for the particular example of quantum theory the
condition is trivially satisfied as it is the case for any atomistic property lattice.24 Now, any complete
lattice L has DI(L) of distributive ideals as its distributive hull (Bruns and Lakser 1970), providing the
construction with a (quasi-)universal property.25 Moreover, DI(L) itself always proves to be a complete
Heyting algebra and the inclusion preserves all meets and existing distributive joins. Thus, DI(L) encodes
all possible disjunctions of properties, and moreover, it turns out that all DI(L)-meets are conjunctive and
all DI(L)-joins are disjunctive — note again that this is definitely not the case in the powerset P(L) of
a property lattice, since {a} ∩ {b} = ∅ whenever a 6= b independent of what a ∧ b is. This means that
we can ‘extend’ the consequence relation of eq.(5) to ⊢ ⊆ P(DI(L)) × P(DI(L)) respectively in terms of
consequence and satisfaction as
A, . . . (A ∈ A) ⊢ B, . . . (B ∈ B) ⇐⇒
⋂
A ⊢
∨
DI(L)
B ⇐⇒
⋂
A ⊆
∨
DI(L)
B , (23)
⇐⇒ (∀p)((∀A ∈ A : p |= A)⇒ (∃B ∈ B : p |= B)) (24)
where we recall that a ≤ b ⇔↓ a ⊆↓ b and as such ↓ (
∧
A) =
⋂
a∈A ↓ a encodes the properties within
this set of propositions on properties — A ⊆ L is here to be seen as just a set of properies without the
disjunctive connotation of the distributive ideals in DI(L) . As demonstrated in Coecke (2001a) it follows
from all this that the object equivalence between:
i. complete lattices, and,
ii. complete Heyting algebras equipped with a distributive closure, i.e. it preserves distributive sets,
encodes a disjunctive representation for property lattices, where we, DI(L) being a complete Heyting
algebra, do have a Heyting hook
(− →DI(L) −) : DI(L)×DI(L)→ DI(L) : (B,C) 7→
∨
DI(L)
{A ∈ DI(L)|A ∩ B ⊆ C} , (25)
24Whenever this condition is satisfied one can also construct a disjunctive extension, which is obviously not anymore the
distributive extension, but something ‘inbetween’ the distributive extension and the downset completion where corresponding
inclusions are injective order embeddings that preserve all meets and the bottom element (Coecke 2001a).
25Injective hulls are actually not universal in a strictly categorical sense. However, it is possible to give a characterization
of distributive hulls in terms of a so-called ‘frame completion’, which is a monoreflection and as such strictly universal. See
for example Harding (1999) and Stubbe (2001).
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where the explicit DI(L)-joins are given by
∨
DI(L)
: P(DI(L))→ DI(L) : A 7→
⋂{
B ∈ DI(L)
∣∣∣ B ⊇
⋃
A
}
(26)
(meets are obviously intersections), and we will argue below that this hook is implicative sensu “with
respect to actuality”, i.e. in the sense that in the property lattice
∧
was conjunctive and in the sense we
defined disjunctivity when motivating the use of distributive ideals. One verifies that we actually obtain26
(B →DI(L) C) = {a ∈ L | ∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b ∈ C} . (27)
The true quantum features are (at this ‘static’ level) encoded in an operational resolution
RDI(L) : DI(L)→ DI(L) : A 7→↓
(∨
L
A
)
(28)
that recaptures statements expressing actuality of properties within the larger collection of propositions
on actuality of them, and that only for classical systems becomes trivial, being the identity. The logical
essence of this representation is such that, rather than seeing the shift “from classical to quantum” as a
weakening of the property lattice structure from a distributive lattice to a non-distributive one, we envision
this transition as going from a trivial additional operation on the propositions (which as a consequence in
the classical case coincide with the properties) to a non-trivial one. Note that the non-distributive features
are as such recaptured as the range of this additional operation R , but they don’t affect distributivity
of the domain. Quantum logic becomes as such ordinary logic with an additional operation, a bit in the
sense of modal logic. From a pragmatic formal attitude, this construction however seems to conflict with
statements about the non-distributive nature of quantum theory, what, for some authors is exactly the
essence of quantum logicality. In the quantum case, the non-distributivity does not come in within the
ordering of propositions, but as the range of the operationR which acts on the propositions. Also the other
axioms considered in axiomatic approaches, e.g. orthomodularity, have the same incarnation. We refer to
Coecke (2001b) for a more elaborated discussion on the significance/conceptions of non-distributivity in
the context of quantum theory.
Going back to the explicit construction of the Heyting hook for propositions on properties, it as such
also turns out that the canonical implication on a lattice of properties is an external one that takes values
in DI(L), namely
(− →L −) : L× L→ DI(L) : (b, c) 7→ {a ∈ L|a ∧ b ≤ c} (29)
obtained by domain and codomain restriction of (− →DI(L) −) . If and only if L is itself a complete
Heyting algebra, then we can represent this external operation faithfully as an internal one by setting
(b→ c) :=
∨
(b→L c) . In particular can our external implication arrow be defined by
a ∧ b ≤ c ⇐⇒ a ∈ (b→L c) , (30)
as such in a more explicit manner expressing that it generalizes the implication that lives on a complete
Heyting algebra where a ∈ (b→L c) then coincides with a ≤ (b→ c) . Within DI(L) we see that (b→L c)
is the set of properties whose actuality makes the deduction “if b is actual then c is actual” true, i.e.
26Note here that {a ∈ L | ∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b ∈ C} indeed defines a member of DI(L) . First, we have that x′ ≤ x implies
x′ ∧ b ≤ x ∧ b for x ∈ (B →DI(L) C) = {a ∈ L | ∀b ∈ B : a ∧ b ∈ C} such that x
′ ∧ b ∈ C since C ∈ DI(L) . Next, for
X ⊆ (B →DI(L) C) with X a distributive set, i.e. ∀c ∈ L : c∧
∨
X =
∨
{c∧ x | x ∈ X} , one easily verifies that distributivity
of X implies distributivity of {b ∧ x | x ∈ X} and thus (
∨
X) ∧ b =
∨
{b ∧ x | x ∈ X} ∈ C so
∨
X ∈ (B →DI(L) C) .
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given a ∈ (b →L c) , then ∀p ∈ Σa : (p |= b ⇒ p |= c) where Σa := {p ∈ Σ|p |= a} . In other words,
(− →L −) transcribes in terms of actuality the minimal requirement of any functional formal implication
with respect to extensional quantification over the state set. Note that by constructing (− →L −) via
(slightly abusively) domain restriction from DI(L)×DI(L) to L×L we exhibit clearly that (− →L −) can
(again) be made internal via a domain extension, and, that this extension has physical significance and
moreover prerserves all the physically derivable logicality of L . As a statement: “(− →L −) is the [closest
you can get to] implication on the lattice of properties”. In relation to the minimal implicative condition
we obtain
L ∈ (a→L b) ⇐⇒ a ≤ b ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ Σ : (p |= a⇒ p |= b) (31)
for (− →L −) whereas for (− →DI(L) −) this ‘extends’ to
L = (A→DI(L) B) ⇐⇒ A ⊆ B ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ Σ : (p |= A⇒ p |= B) . (32)
Note that →DI(L) as an operation, is the parameterized right adjoint with respect to the respective
meet actions {(A ∩ −)|A ∈ DI(L)} . The above leads to a semantical interpretation of (− →DI(L) −)
as p |= (A→DI(L) B) ⇐⇒ (p |= A⇒ p |= B) , or, equivalently,
µ(A→DI(L) B) = {p ∈ Σ|p |= A⇒ p |= B} , (33)
where, extending the usual Cartan map µ : L→ P(Σ) : a 7→ {p ∈ Σ|p ≺ a} , we define µ(A) :=
⋃
µ[A] , the
square brackets referring to pointwise application of µ , i.e. in semantical terms, µ(A) = {p ∈ Σ|p |= A} .
Note at this point that there is indeed a duality in representing propositions in terms of DI(L) or in terms
of a particular subset F(Σ) of P(Σ) defined as F(Σ) := {µ(A)|A ∈ DI(L)} , which, for atomistic L , turns
out to be P(Σ) itself. In more syntactical terms, i.e. without referring to the state space interpretation,
adjointness allows us explicitly to restate (− →DI(L) −) as
27
(A→DI(L) B) =
∨
DI(L)
{C ∈ DI(L) | ∀D ⊢ C : (D ⊢ A⇒ D ⊢ B)} (34)
=
∨
DI(L)
{C ∈ DI(L) | ∀d ∈ C : (d ∈ A⇒ d ∈ B)} (35)
= {c ∈ L | ∀d ≤ c : (d ∈ A⇒ d ∈ B)} , (36)
for the latter, rather than explicitly showing that is indeed a distributive ideal such that we can drop the
corresponding closure, we can use eq.(27) and verify straightforwardly that
∀a ∈ A : a ∧ c ∈ B ⇐⇒ ∀d ≤ c : (d ∈ A⇒ d ∈ B) . (37)
As such, for properties we obtain, syntactically,
(a→L b) = {c ∈ L | ∀d ⊢ c : (d ⊢ a⇒ d ⊢ b)} . (38)
How does the Sasaki hook relate to this implication? Since ϕ∗a(b) = a∧ (b∨ a
′) ≥ a∧ b and thus ϕ∗−(−) ≥
(−∧−) pointwisely — recall here that (−
L
→ −) arises as domain restriction of the right adjoint of the action
of the DI(L)-meets, the latter encoding for properties the L-meet in terms of intersection of principal ideals.
For the corresponding adjoints of the actions we have a∧ (a
S
→ b) = a∧ (a′∨ (b∧a)) = ϕ∗a(b∧a) = b∧a ≤ b
27Since A ⊆ B ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A : a ∈ B ⇐⇒ ∀p |= A : p |= B ⇐⇒ (∀p)(p |= A ⇒ p |= B) , due to the equivalence induced by
eq.(6) , we have C ⊆ (A→DI(L) B)⇐⇒ (C ∩A) ⊆ B ⇐⇒ (∀p)(p |= C ∩A⇒ p |= B)⇐⇒ (∀p)(p |= C, p |= A⇒ p |= B)⇐⇒
∀p |= C : (p |= A⇒ p |= B) , where again eq.(6) allows expressing this in terms of D ⊢ C rather than p |= C .
14
and thus (a
S
→ b) ∈ {c ∈ L|a ∧ c ≤ b} = (a→Lb) , or, differently put, ↓ (−
S
→ −) ≤ (−→L−) pointwisely.
In terms of actions this gives us for the corresponding adjoint pairs (a∧−) ⊣ (a→L−) — with slight abuse
of notation, see eq.(30) — and ϕ∗a(−) ⊣ (a
S
→ −)
(a→L−) ≥↓(a
S
→ −) and (a ∧ −) ≤ ϕ∗a(−) , (39)
expressing reversal of pointwise order by adjunction. Thus, from a semantical perspective, ↓ (−
S
→ −) :
L×L→ DI(L) is a restriction of the (static) implication (− →L −) . So, if the Sasaki adjunction doesn’t
encode a ‘real’ implication, what does it do. This will be explained in the next section.
5. THE SASAKI ADJUNCTION INCARNATES CAUSAL DUALITY
Causal duality has been derived in Coecke, Moore and Stubbe (2001) inspired on derivations in Faure,
Moore and Piron (1995). Rather than giving a full derivation, we sketch a more intuitive way of looking at
the obtained results. Assume (so we don’t give a full proof here) for a system placed in an environment e ,
e.g., an environment ea sensu section 2,
28 during a time interval [t1, t2] (which can be envisioned as being
infinitesimal) that there exist the maps:29
i. ‘Propagation of properties’ e∗ : L1 → L2 that assigns to any property a1 ∈ L1 the strongest property
e∗(a1) ∈ L2 of which actuality is implied at time t2 due to actuality of a1 at time t1 ;
ii. ‘Causal assignment of properties’ e∗ : L2 → L1 that assigns to any property a2 ∈ L2 the weakest
property e∗(a2) ∈ L1 whose actuality at time t1 guarantees actuality of a2 at time t2 .
Since, given a2 ∈ L2 , e∗(a2) ∈ L1 guarantees actuality of a2 at time t2 , e∗(a2) has to propagate to a
property that is stronger (or equal) than a2 and as such e
∗(e∗(a2)) ≤ a2 . Analogously, given a1 ∈ L1 ,
since it propagates into e∗(a1) , actuality of a1 at t1 guarantees actuality of e
∗(a1) at t2 and as such
a1 ≤ e∗(e
∗(a1)) . Thus, from e
∗(e∗(a2)) ≤ a2 and a1 ≤ e∗(e
∗(a1)) we obtain e
∗ ⊣ e∗ , and this adjunction is
what we refer to as causal duality. The generality of the principle lies in the fact that besides applying to
temporal processes it also applies to compoundness (Coecke 2000).30
We started the first paragraph of the previous section with a discussion on (dichotomic) perfect quantum
measurements with the aim to exhibit the emergence of disjunction. In view of section 2 we can denote
the corresponding environment that provokes such a measurement, i.e. the presence of the corresponding
measuring device, as ϕ{a,a′} . In the following paragraphs we then additionally argued that the disjunctive
extension has the extra advantage that it allows us to encode an external implicative hook on L×L which
then extends to an internal implication on the whole of DI(L)× DI(L) . Thus, the use of the disjunctive
extension for representing quantum systems goes beyond representing the emergent disjunction in the sense
that it has also a pure logical motivation in terms of envisioning (static) quantum logicality as ordinary
logicality with the additional presence of a non-trivial operational resolution R : DI(L) → DI(L) . For
the particular case of a perfect quantum measurement, we are going to restrict us now to the specific
example where we consider a transition only provided a certain positive outcome is obtained, say a for
simplicity, what actually means that whenever the system is within environment ϕ{a,a′} we condition on
28And for simplicity assumed to be non-destructive.
29The existence can be proved — see Coecke, Moore and Stubbe (2001) and Faure, Moore and Piron (1995).
30We want to stress here that causal duality actuality allows us to prove things and is such is not just a fancy way of
writing things down. For a proof of linearity of Schro¨dinger flows, given that the property lattice of the corresponding system
is LH , see Faure, Piron and Moore (1995) . For a proof that the tensor product of Hilbert spaces is appropriate to describe
compoundness for systems with as property lattice LH see Coecke (2000) . Conclusively, if the space in which we describe
the system is linear, then causal duality forces temporal propagation and compoundness to be described by linear maps.
These results essentially use Faure and Fro¨licher (1993, 1994) .
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the fact that a is obtained — note however, not necessarily in a causal manner, i.e. a does not have
to be actual before the measurement. A concrete way to envision this specific situation is in terms of
a filter, that whenever the outcome corresponding to a is not obtained the system will be destroyed.31
Let us denote the corresponding environment as ϕa . Now, since the Sasaki projection ϕ
∗
a : L(1) → L(2)
— t2 = t1 + ǫ — encodes the behavior of a system under a perfect quantum measurement ϕ{a,a′} when
the outcome corresponding to a is obtained, it encodes the propagation of properties with respect to ϕa
(justifying the notation ϕ∗a in perspective of the previous paragraph) and should as such admit a left
adjoint expressing (backward) causal assignment, and this is exactly how (a
S
→ −) = ϕa,∗(−) : L(2) → L(1)
arises in this setting. Sasaki adjunction constitutes as such an incarnation of causal duality. This already
‘partly’ explains the title of this paper — a more compelling perspective will be discussed in the next
section. In particular will we show how causal duality extends to a dynamic logical setting. First we need
to introduce causal relations as a dynamic counterpart to the static ordering of properties in the property
lattice.
Along the lines of the heuristics behind eq.(3) we can introduce the following two relations, whenever
an environment e is specified, taking a t1-perspective :
e
❀ ⊆ L1 × L2 : a1
e
❀ a2 ⇔ “actuality of a1 at t1 implies ✷-actuality of a2 at t2
′′ ; (40)
e
" ⊆ L1 × L2 : a1
e
" a2 ⇔ “✷-actuality of a2 at t2 implies actuality of a1 at t1
′′ . (41)
Now, what do we mean by taking a t1-perspective , and, ✷-actuality? From the perspective at time t1 , i.e.
before the interaction of the system and the environment e takes place, there are two modes of envisioning
actuality at time t2 , namely i. “a2 can be actual”, the uncertainty being due to the indeterministic nature
of the interaction of the system with the environment, and, ii. “a2 will be actual”, definitely. Note that
for deterministic transitions these two coincide. Motivated by the modal logic symbolism, we can refer to
these two alternatives respectively as ✸-actuality and ✷-actuality 32 — whenever we mention ✸-actuality
and ✷-actuality we implicitly refer to a t1-perspective.
33 In general we clearly have for a fixed property a2
at t2 that ✷−actuality =⇒ ✸−actuality . Formally, this gives us the following (semantical) definitions
for
e
❀ and
e
" :
a1
e
❀ a2 ⇐⇒ (∀p)1(p |= a1 ⇒ e˜
∗({p}) |= a2) (42)
a1
e
" a2 ⇐⇒ (∀p)1(p |= a1 ⇐ e˜
∗({p}) |= a2) (43)
where the index 1 in (∀p)1 refers to the fact that we quantify over states at time t1 , where e˜
∗({p}) denotes
the states the system can have after interaction with the environment e and where e˜∗({p}) |= a2 stands for
∀q ∈ e˜∗({p}) : q |= a2 . More explicitly referring to eq.(3) we see that as such the relations
e
❀ and
e
" can be
defined in terms of the actuality relation. The major advantage of taking an a priori t1-perspective is that
it will allow us to introduce binary connectives that extend this relation ‘with the same codomain’, this
extension is to be envisioned in the sense that the relation ≤⊆ L×L has been extended to an implication —
sensu eq.(31) and eq.(32) — namely (− →DI(L) −) , provided that we considered the disjunctive extension
DI(L) of L and not just L itself. When asking the question whether in some manner the relations
e
❀ and
31See also Piron (1976) on measurements as filters and see Smets (2001) for a recent survey.
32For the use of modal-operators in static operational quantum logic, where the operators point out the so-called ‘classical
limit properties’ we refer to Coecke, Moore and Smets (2001a) and Smets (2001, §10) . This however shouldn’t be confused
with the association to modalities made in this paper.
33Note here that the notions ✸-actuality and ✷-actuality have only significance with respect to a t1-perspective. In
particular, referring to the two modes of envisioning actuality at time t2 in the t1-perspective, in a t2-perspective there is
only one since the interaction of the system with the environment did take place.
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e
" indeed extend to connectives it will as such be no surprise that we should again rather consider DI(Li)
than Li itself. By ‘with the same codomain’ we mean that both will be represented in DI(Li) — note here
indeed that we do not require L1 ∼= L2 and as such also not DI(L1) ∼= DI(L2) . (Obviously, all this requires
to some extend a pluralistic attitude, we indeed admit that: One could for example find a motivation to
consider a t2-perspective; this then leads us to a bouquet of definable causal relations and corresponding
dynamic implications.) Note also that the necessity of having to consider the disjunctive extension already
follows from the following observation: given a specified referential frame, one could define an environment
freeze (with obvious significance), for which it clearly follows that (−
freeze
❀ −) ≡ (− ≤ −) ≡ (−
freeze
" −) ,
i.e. freeze provides a static limit for the more general dynamic formalism that involves explicitation of the
environment. As it can be seen in eq.(42) and eq.(43) , all these considerations will involve introducing the
notions of propagation of propositions and causal assignment for propositions, or equivalently, in terms
of the corresponding sets of states that make a proposition true with respect to actuality of one of its
members, e.g., e˜({p}) . We will do this in the next paragraph. First we take a look on how these relations
are realized for the above discussed heuristics for the Sasaki adjunction. Following Coecke, Moore and
Stubbe (2001) , we obtain respectively by the definitions of ϕ∗a and
ϕa
❀ , and, explicit expression of causal
duality, that 34
ϕ∗a(a1) ≤ a2 ⇐⇒ a1
ϕa
❀ a2 ⇐⇒ a1 ≤ ϕa,∗(a2) , (44)
from which it also follows that a1
ϕa
❀ ϕ∗a(a1) , that ϕa,∗(a2)
ϕa
❀ a2 , and in particular, using ϕ
∗
a(1) = a , that
1
ϕa
❀ a . By the second equivalence in eq.(44) we moreover obtain
Corollary 1. b ⊢ (a
S
→ c) ⇐⇒ b
ϕa
❀ c .
The case of the backward relation is less straightforward (and in a sense also less canonical). Indeed,
both in the definitions of e∗ and e∗ we use a forwardly expressed condition in terms of “actuality at t1
guarantees actuality at t2” , where the definition of
e
" points backwardly . However, we can quite easily
prove a similar result as exposed in eq.(44) . We first do this for a general environment e .
Proposition 3. a1 ≥ e∗(a2) ⇐⇒ a1
e
" a2 and thus a1 ≥ ϕa,∗(a2) ⇐⇒ a1
ϕa
" a2 .
Proof: (⇐=) : From p |= e∗(a2) , by definition of e∗(a2) as “guarantees actuality of a2 at t2”, it follows
that e˜∗({p}) |= a2 , so by a1
e
" a2 we then obtain p |= a1 and thus a1 ≥ e∗(a2) . (=⇒) : We will first
prove that e∗(a2)
e
" a2 , i.e. (∀p)1(p |= e∗(a2) ⇐ e˜
∗({p}) |= a2) . Once this is done, a1
e
" a2 given that
a1 ≥ e∗(a2) now follows straightforwardly. Since e∗(a2) is the weakest property that guarantees actuality
of a2 at t2 we clearly have p |= e∗(a2) for all states p at t1 that guarantee actuality of a2 , i.e. e˜
∗({p}) |= a2 ,
so we do have e∗(a2)
e
" a2 , what completes this proof.
Corollary 2. (a
S
→ c) ⊢ b ⇐⇒ b
ϕa
" c .
Corollary 3. b = (a
S
→ c) ⇐⇒ b
ϕa
❀ c & b
ϕa
" c .
Note that as a part of the proof of Proposition 3 we obtained e∗(a2)
e
" a2 , and that by Proposition 3 itself
we obtain an alternative way of defining causal assignment e∗ , namely as:
34Indeed, ϕ∗a(a1) ≤ a2 =⇒ a1
ϕa
❀ a2 follows from the definition of ≤ , and ϕ∗a(a1) ≤ a2 ⇐= a1
ϕa
❀ a2 follows from the fact
that ϕ∗a(a1) is the strongest property who’s actuality is implied by that of a1 and as such implies any other of that kind.
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ii’. ‘Causal assignment of properties’ e∗ : L2 → L1 that assigns to any property a2 ∈ L2 the strongest
property e∗(a2) ∈ L1 whose actuality is implied by ✷-actuality of a2 at time t2 .
This alternative definition clearly exhibits in a more manifest way the backwardness of causal assignment,
and consequently, of the action of the Sasaki hook. One easily verifies that contra eq.(44) for the case of
e
❀
there is no obvious expression of
e
" in terms of e∗ . The naive idea one could have to propose e∗(a1) ≥ a2
breaks down on the fact that this would imply e∗ ⊣ e
∗ what forces e∗ and e∗ to be mutually inverse,
something that in general (obviously) doesn’t hold. We will now proceed by ‘extending’ the relations
ϕa
❀
and
ϕa
" to operations.
6. THE SASAKI HOOK WITHIN DYNAMIC OPERATIONAL QUANTUM LOGIC
First note that for general environments e the relations
e
❀ ⊆ L1 × L2 and
e
" ⊆ L1 × L2 easily extend to
DI(L1) × DI(L2) by replacing “(✷-)actuality of ...” by “truth with respect to (✷-)actuality of a member
of ...” , explicitly,
A1
e
❀ A2 ⇐⇒ (∀p)1(p |= A1 ⇒ e˜
∗({p}) |= A2) (45)
A1
e
" A2 ⇐⇒ (∀p)1(p |= A1 ⇐ e˜
∗({p}) |= A2) (46)
where e˜∗({p}) |= A2 now stands for ∀q ∈ e˜
∗({p}) : q |= A2 , i.e. ∀q ∈ e˜
∗({p}), ∃a2 ∈ A2 : q |= a2 , and where
one verifies that ↓a1
e
❀ ↓a2 ⇐⇒ a1
e
❀ a2 and ↓a1
e
" ↓a2 ⇐⇒ a1
e
" a2 . Thus we can write elements of
the image of R, i.e., those elements in DI(L) that represent properties, by the properties themselves. In
view of eq.(33) , eq.(45) and eq.(46) it seems natural to set
µ(A1
e
→ A2) := {p ∈ Σ1|p |= A1 ⇒ e˜
∗({p}) |= A2} (47)
µ(A1
e
← A2) := {p ∈ Σ1|p |= A1 ⇐ e˜
∗({p}) |= A2} (48)
indeed yielding an extension of the relations since
A1
e
❀ A2 ⇐⇒ (A1
e
→ A2) = L and A1
e
" A2 ⇐⇒ (A1
e
← A2) = L . (49)
One verifies that on their turn (−
e
→ −) and (−
e
← −) respectively define two tensors (− ⊗e −) and
(− e⊗−) via adjunction (Coecke 2001b; Coecke, Moore and Smets 2001b; Smets 2001), i.e.
(A⊗e −) ⊣ (A
e
→ −) and (− e⊗ A) ⊣ (−
e
← A) . (50)
In order to understand the significance of these tensors, first observe that the causal duality derived in
the previous section for maps respectively expressing propagation and causation for properties, can also
be derived for maps expressing propagation and causation of the propositions in DI(L) , or equivalently ,
expressing propagation and causation of sets of states in F(Σ) . This actually corresponds to forgetting
about the existence of R and applying the construction towards causal duality as if DI(L) ∼= F(Σ) is the
lattice of properties of a classical system. The existence of a right adjoint of the map eˆ∗ : DI(L1)→ DI(L2)
that assigns to A1 ∈ DI(L1) the strongest proposition in DI(L2) of which truth (i.e. actuality of a member)
is implied by that of A1 , or equivalently, of the map e˜
∗ : F(Σ1) → F(Σ2) that assigns to T1 ∈ F(Σ1)
the collection in F(Σ2) of obtainable outcome states given that the initial state is in T1 , then imply
preservation of respectively
∨
DI(L) and
⋃
, i.e. disjunction. Complementary, since existence of a right
adjoint for propagation of properties encodes preservation of joins for properties, it follows from Coecke
and Stubbe (1999) and Coecke (2001a) that
∨
LA =
∨
LB =⇒
∨
L eˆ
∗(A) =
∨
L eˆ
∗(B) , or, expressed
within DI(L) ,
RDI(L)(A) = RDI(L)(B) =⇒ RDI(L)(eˆ
∗(A)) = RDI(L)(eˆ
∗(B)) . (51)
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Thus, a shift “from classical to quantum” implies, besides the emergence of the operation R , that classical
“preservation of disjunction” becomes a pair consisting of i. preservation of disjunction, and, ii. the
continuity-like condition of eq.(51) . Thus, coexistence of laws on propagation at the level of L and DI(L)
is not a redundancy. 35 One now verifies that
(L⊗e −) = eˆ
∗(−) and (L e⊗−) = eˆ∗(−) , (52)
from which follow preservation properties with respect to meet and join, additionally to the ones that
follow from the fact that the tensors encode the left-adjoint actions to the hooks.36
How does all this apply to the context of quantum measurements, and as such, how does the Sasaki
adjunction fits in at this point. First note that we have
ϕˆ∗a : DI(L1)→ DI(L2) : B 7→
∨
DI(L)
{ ↓ϕ∗a(b)|b ∈ B} ; ↓b 7→ ↓ϕ
∗
a(b) , (53)
i.e. ϕ∗a and ϕˆ
∗
a act in the same on properties due to the eliminated emergence of disjunction in ϕa . Do we
have the same correspondens for the action of ϕa,∗ and ϕˆa,∗ ?
Proposition 4. Given f ∗ ⊣ f∗ : L1 → L2 and fˆ
∗ ⊣ fˆ∗ : DI(L1) → DI(L2) , then ↓ f
∗(−) = fˆ ∗( ↓−) on
L1 implies ↓f∗(−) = fˆ∗( ↓−) on L2 .
Proof: For a, b ∈ L : fˆ ∗( ↓ b) ⊆↓ a ⇐⇒↓ fˆ ∗(b) ⊆↓ a ⇐⇒ fˆ ∗(b) ≤ a ⇐⇒ b ≤ f∗(a) so fˆ
∗( ↓ a) =∨
DI(L2)
{B ∈ DI(L2)|fˆ
∗(B) ⊆↓a} =
∨
DI(L2)
{↓b|b ∈ L2 , b ≤ f∗(a)} =
∨
DI(L2)
{↓f∗(a)} =↓f∗(a) . •
Thus, ϕˆa,∗ acts on properties as the Sasaki hook does, and it makes therefore sense to set
(a
S
→ −) := ϕˆa,∗(−) : DI(L)→ DI(L) . (54)
What do we obtain in case for eq.(47) and eq.(48) in particular for properties as arguments? Setting
cT := Σ \ T we obtain 37
µ(a1
ϕa
→ a2) =
cµ(a1) ∪ µ(a
S
→ a2) and µ(a1
ϕa
← a2) =
cµ(a
S
→ a2) ∪ µ(a1) . (55)
Note here in particular that the Sasaki hook does appear in the expression of both (a1
ϕa
→ a2) and (a1
ϕa
← a2) ,
however with a different antecedent than (a1
ϕa
→ a2) and (a1
ϕa
← a2) . One verifies that using
(a1
ϕa
→ a2) = (a1 →L ϕa,∗(a2)) and (a1
ϕa
← a2) = (ϕa,∗(a2)→L a1) , (56)
obtained via adjointness of ϕ∗a and ϕa,∗ and Proposition 4 , and eq.(29) and eq.(30) we obtain
(a1
ϕa
→ a2) = {b ∈ L1|a1 ∧ b ≤ (a
S
→ a2)}
= (a1 →L (a
S
→ a2))
and
(a1
ϕa
← a2) = {b ∈ L1|(a
S
→ a2) ∧ b ≤ a1}
= ((a
S
→ a2)→L a1)
(57)
35Note here that where L induced a closure on DI(L) , we formally obtain in this case a restriction on the corresponding
hom-sets SL(DI(L1),DI(L2)) in SL , the category of complete lattices and join-preserving maps. As shown in Coecke and
Stubbe (1999) , the physically admissible transitions constitute a subset of SL(DI(L1),DI(L2)) for which there exists a
‘quantaloid morphism’ R : SL(DI(L1),DI(L2))→ SL(L1, L2) .
36It turns out that (− ⊗e −) and (− e⊗−) respectively provide DI(L) with the structure of a commutative quantale and
an in general non-commutative dual quantale (Coecke 2001b; Coecke, Moore and Smets 2001b) .
37E.g. via µ(a1
ϕ1
→ a2) = {p ∈ Σ1 | p |= a1 ⇒ ϕ∗a(p) |= a2} = {p ∈ Σ1 | p |= a1 ⇒ p |= ϕ∗,a(a2)} =
cµ(a1) ∪ µ(a
S
→ a2) .
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i.e. respectively a forward and a backward dynamic ϕa-modification of the static hook (− →L −) . Similar
equations can be obtained for arguments in DI(L1)× DI(L2) . For the tensors we obtain
(A1 ⊗ϕaA2) = ϕˆ
∗
a(A1 ∧DI(L) A2) and (A1 ϕa⊗A2) = (A1 ∧DI(L) (a
S
→ A2)) . (58)
By construction we have the following modified versions of deduction and modus ponens (we express them
for properties in analogy to eq.(8) and eq.(9) , the significance of the tensors is obvious):
b⊗ϕa c ⊢ d ⇒ c ⊢ (b
ϕa
→ d) b⊗ϕa (b
ϕa
→ c) ⊢ c b ϕa⊗ c ⊢ d ⇒ b ⊢ (d
ϕa
← c) (c
ϕa
← b) ϕa⊗ b ⊢ c . (59)
We give a global overview of where the Sasaki operations fit in within DOQL—we introduced the notations
↓ [L] := {↓a | a ∈ L} , (−
S
← a) := (a
S
→ −) and (− ←X · ) := ( · →X −) for X ∈ {L,DI(L)} .
38
Statical (freezed dynamical) ϕa-induced forward dynamical ϕa-induced backward dynamical
idL : L→ L ϕ
∗
a(−) : L1 → L2 ϕa,∗(−) = (−
S
← a) : L2 → L1
idDI(L) : DI(L)→ DI(L) ϕˆ
∗
a(−) = ↓ϕ
∗
a(−) on ↓ [L1] ϕˆa,∗(−) = ↓(−
S
← a) on ↓ [L2]
(− →L −) : L× L→ DI(L) (−
ϕa
→ −) = (− →L (a
S
→ −)) (−
ϕa
← −) = (− ←L (−
S
← a))
(− →DI(L) −) on DI(L) (−
ϕa
→ −) = (− →DI(L) (a
S
→ −)) (−
ϕa
← −) = (− ←DI(L) (−
S
← a))
(− ∧DI(L) −) on DI(L) (−⊗ϕa−) = ϕˆ
∗
a(− ∧DI(L) −) (−ϕa⊗−) = (− ∧DI(L) (−
S
← a))
Using eq.(56) we can actually formally recover the Sasaki hook and projections as
(1
ϕa
→ −) = (1→L (a
S
→ −)) = (a
S
→ −) (1⊗ϕa−) = ϕ
∗
a(1 ∧ −) = ϕ
∗
a(−) . (60)
In the static case both of these become the identity, i.e. (1→L−) = (1 ∧ −) = idL , this giving the Sasaki
hook and projectors a formal interpretation as dynamic modifications of the identity. Let us conclude this
section with the following identities
((a
S
→ b)
ϕa
→ b) = L ((a
S
→ b)
ϕa
← b) = L (61)
or, differently put
(a
S
→ b)
ϕa
❀ b (a
S
→ b)
ϕa
" b (62)
what formally encodes our interpretation of what the Sasaki hook does.
7. QUANTUM LOGIC RESEARCH? HOW TO CONVERT?
As mentioned above, Coecke (2001a), the traditional domain of study of quantum-like lattices should now
be envisioned as a study of the range of the operation R , with corresponding heuristics. This obviously
sheds a different light on the significance of, for example, orthomodularity. Weak modularity actually
doesn’t come in at all in the disjunctive extension construction — we recall from Coecke (2001a) that
orthocomplementation comes in in the sense that it means that operational resolution has an involutive
square-root named the ‘operational complementation’. However, since orthomodularity is equivalent with
38We note that there are some subtilities which we didn’t mention for sake of transparancy of the argument, in particular
with respect to ϕ∗a(b) = 0 where we have two options: i. introduce a kernel of inadmissible initial states, i.e., consider
ϕ˜∗a : F(Σ\K)→ F(Σ) , or, consider upper pointed extensions sensu (Coecke, Moore and Stubbe 2001; Sourbron 2001) . Note
that similar considerations can be made for environments ϕ{a,a′} instead of ϕa although then we truly obtain two levels, one
for ϕ∗{a,a′} and ϕ{a,a′}∗ and one for ϕˆ
∗
{a,a′} and ϕˆ{a,a′}∗ .
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the Sasaki adjunction and this Sasaki adjunction in its turn represents causal duality, we have provided
a new dynamic interpretation of the axiom of orthomodularity. But, we can push this further. The
essential conclusion that comes out of our analysis is that in traditional quantum logic “too much was
encoded in too little”: properties where identified with propositions, temporal phenomena like ‘change
of state in a measurement’ where statically encoded, the distinction between the structure of properties
and event structures was in many occasions mixed up, etc. What about event structures? Since we
claimed that there was no conflict between an endo- and an exo-perspective, where could they fit in in our
setting? They clearly should lie at the base of structuring the collection of environments.39 From a logical
perspective, this implies a two-dimensional situation: a structure of environments that interacts with a
structure of propositions on a system. Of particular interest would then be the case where we restrict to
environments {ϕa|a ∈ L} , as we essentially did in this paper. This would mean that the environments
are structured in the same way as the image of R , order-isomorphic to the properties L , so this realizes
a structure in which the lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space appears both as the properties and
as labels encoding (physical) environments, where actually we rather think about the latter as being the
projectors in standard quantum theory. In that sense the situation of “too much being encoded in too little”
gets explicitly unraveled, and motivates that it truly seems to make sense to distinguish between closed
subspaces and projectors at an abstract structural level although they are in bijective correspondence, the
first having an ontological connotation, the second an empirical. This then leads to the perspective that
the transition from either classical or constructive/intuitionistic logic to quantum logic entails besides the
introduction of an additional unary connective operational resolution R : DI(L)→ DI(L) the shift from a
binary connective implication to a ternary connective
(−
−
→ −) : DI(L)×R[DI(L)]× DI(L)→ DI(L) . (63)
where two of the arguments refer to qualities of the system and the third, the new one, to an obtained
outcome (in a measurement). A better way of putting things would be
(−
−
→ −) : DI(L)× P(L)× DI(L)→ DI(L) . (64)
where P(L) are the projectors (on corresponding closed subspaces) what for general orthomodular lattices
ends up being the Baer ∗-semigroup of projectors in the Foulis (1960) sense. In view of Piron’s (1964)
theorem it then follows that this situation fully covers ‘pointless quantum theory’ — sensu pointless
topology in terms of locales, i.e. complete Heyting algebras — since we drop the two point-related axioms
atomisticity and covering law in order to have a (complete) orthomodular lattice. Another extrapolation
of the setting presented in this paper consists of rather than defining dynamic operations (labeled by
environments) on the static propositions DI(L) , we start of from ‘dynamic propositions’, i.e. propositions
on ‘propagation of (actual) properties’ rather than on actuality itself and here inspiration can be found
in research within the domain of for example computational process semantics (Milner 1999), action logic
(Baltag 1999) etc. Obviously, much is still to be done in that direction.
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